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公共英語五級(jí)wsk閱讀強(qiáng)化試題
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(Clinton Is Right)
President Clinton’s decision on Apr.8 to send Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji packing without an agreement on China’s entry into the World Trade Organization seemed to be a massive miscalculation. The President took a drubbing from much of the press， which had breathlessly reported that a deal was in the bag. The Cabinet and Whit House still appeared divided， and business leaders were characterized as furious over the lost opportunity. Zhu charged that Clinton lacked “the courage” to reach an accord. And when Clinton later telephoned the angry Zhu to pledge a renewed effort at negotiations， the gesture was widely portrayed as a flip-flop.
In fact， Clinton made the right decision in holding out for a better WTO deal. A lot more horse trading is needed before a final agreement can be reached. And without the Administration’s goal of a “bullet-proof agreement” that business lobbyists can enthusiastically sell to a Republican Congress， the whole process will end up in partisan acrimony that could harm relations with China for years.
THE HARD PART. Many business lobbyists， while disappointed that the deal was not closed， agree that better terms can still be had. And Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin， National Economic Council Director Gene B. Sperling， Commerce Secretary William M. Daley， and top trade negotiator Charlene Barshefsky all advised Clinton that while the Chinese had made a remarkable number of concessions， “we’re not there yet，” according to senior officials.
Negotiating with Zhu over the remaining issues may be the easy part. Although Clinton can signal U.S. approval for China’s entry into the WTO himself， he needs Congress to grant Beijing permanent most-favored-nation status as part of a broad trade accord. And the temptation for meddling on Capital Hill may prove over-whelming. Zhu had barely landed before Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss) declared himself skeptical that China deserved entry into the WTO. And Senators Jesse A. Helms (R-N.C.) and Emest F. Hollings (D-S. C.) promised to introduce a bill requiring congressional approval of any deal.
The hidden message from these three textile-state Southerners： Get more protection for the U. S. clothing industry. Hoping to smooth the way， the Administration tried， but failed， to budge Zhu on textiles. Also left in the lurch： Wall Street， Hollywood， and Detroit. Zhu refused to open up much of the lucrative Chinese securities market and insisted on “cultural” restrictions on American movies and music. He also blocked efforts to allow U. S. auto makers to provide fleet financing.
BIG JOB. Already， business lobbyists are blanketing Capitol Hill to presale any eventual agreement， but what they’ve heard so far isn’t encouraging. Republicans， including Lott， say that “the time just isn’t right” for the deal. Translation： We’re determined to make it look as if Clinton has capitulated to the Chinese and is ignoring human， religious， and labor rights violations; the theft of nuclear-weapons technology; and the sale of missile parts to America’s enemies. Beijing’s fierce critics within the Democratic Party， such as Senator Paul D. Wellstone of Minnesota and House Minority leader Richard A. Gephardt of Missouri， won’t help， either.
Just how tough the lobbying job on Capitol Hill will be become clear on Apr. 20， when Rubin lectured 19chief executives on the need to discipline their Republican allies. With business and the White House still trading charges over who is responsible for the defeat of fast-track trade negotiating legislation in 1997， working together won’t be easy. And Republicans-with a wink-say that they’ll eventually embrace China’s entry into the WTO as a favor to Corporate America. Though not long before they torture Clinton. But Zhu is out on a limb， and if Congress overdoes the criticism， he may be forced by domestic critics to renege. Business must make this much dear to both its GOP allies and the Whit House： This historic deal is too important to risk losing to any more partisan squabbling
1. The main idea of this passage is
[A] The Contradiction between the Democratic Party and the Republican Party.
[B] On China’s entry into WTO.
[C] Clinton was right.
[D] Business Lobbyists Control Capitol Hill.
難句譯注
1. President Clinton’s decision on Apr.8 to send Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji packing without an agreement…
[結(jié)構(gòu)分析] send one packing 打發(fā)人走。
[參考譯文] 克林頓于4月8日決定不達(dá)成中國加入世貿(mào)組織的協(xié)議便打發(fā)中國總理朱镕基走人。
2. The President took a drubbing from much of the press， which had breathlessly reported that a deal was in the bag.
[結(jié)構(gòu)簡析] in the bag 倒手，囊中之物。
[參考譯文] 總統(tǒng)遭到許多報(bào)界輿論的抨擊，它們?cè)鴪?bào)道過這樁買賣(入世貿(mào))已是囊中之物。
答案解析
1. C. 總統(tǒng)是對(duì)的。這篇文章Business Weekly. 文章是從商人的角度來看待中國加入WTO，2. 他們希3. 望從談判中獲得更多的利益，而4. 克林頓的同5. 意不同 6. 意的目的和他們相符--爭取更多利益。這篇就是從四方利益最終趨向一致“同7. 意中國加入世貿(mào)”來證明“總統(tǒng)結(jié)論正確”的中心思想。
第一段指出Clinton由打發(fā)朱總理回國，不同意中國入世到一百八十度大轉(zhuǎn)彎，在電話中憤怒的朱總理表示再次努力協(xié)商。內(nèi)閣和白宮官員意見分歧，商人對(duì)失去機(jī)會(huì)火冒三丈。
第二段點(diǎn)出克林頓故意拖延以謀取更多的利益的決定是正確的--文章的主旨句。商人院外活動(dòng)集團(tuán)成員要以“政府完美無缺的協(xié)議的目標(biāo)來說服共和黨贊成/接受。以免整個(gè)過程以黨爭而告終。
第三，四段是商業(yè)方面的高級(jí)官員的代表紛紛卻說Clinton“當(dāng)中國作出許多優(yōu)惠讓步時(shí)，美國不在那里。”(意：美國吃虧了現(xiàn)在不要再吃虧了。)克林頓有權(quán)簽署贊成中國加入世貿(mào)組織，可他需要國會(huì)批準(zhǔn)北京永久性最惠國作為擴(kuò)大貿(mào)易協(xié)定的組成部分。再說對(duì)國會(huì)的干預(yù)的誘惑力相當(dāng)大：就在朱踏上美國本土?xí)r，參議院多數(shù)派領(lǐng)袖 Trent Lott宣布他對(duì)中國是該不該入世持懷疑態(tài)度，而參議院Tesse A Helms… 承諾提出一項(xiàng)要求國會(huì)批準(zhǔn)任何交易的提案。
第五段講了朱總理的強(qiáng)硬立場(chǎng)。第六段又是共和黨的反對(duì)聲，使民主黨內(nèi)站在北京以便的批評(píng)家也無能為力。
最后一段指出：盡管困難重重，這一歷史事件太重要了，不能因黨爭而冒失失去機(jī)會(huì)的危險(xiǎn)。
A. 民主黨和共和黨的矛盾。兩黨之爭見上文譯注，最終還是一致。 B. 論中國加入世貿(mào)組織。文章不是論中國加入而是論美國環(huán)繞中國入世貿(mào)的種種。 D. 商人院外活動(dòng)集團(tuán)成員控制國會(huì)。這在第五段中提到商人院外活動(dòng)集團(tuán)成員阻撓美國國會(huì)事先接受最終協(xié)議，但不是主題思想。
8. A. 朱總理拒絕了他們的要求。見難句譯注9。
B. 這三個(gè)地方批評(píng)過頭。 C. 他們要求更多的`保護(hù)。 D. 他們陷入困境。
9. A. 矛盾。共和黨一開始就反對(duì)。什么對(duì)中國該不10. 該加入世貿(mào)組織持懷疑態(tài)度。第六段說得更露骨，11. 時(shí)間不12. 對(duì)。意思是他們想把整個(gè)事件看起來好象克林頓屈從于中國，13. 忽視了“中國違反人權(quán)，14. 宗教權(quán)，15. 勞動(dòng)權(quán)，16. 偷竊核武器技術(shù)，17. 把導(dǎo)彈組成部件買給美國的敵人”等事實(shí)。最后一段共和黨一下子又所他們最終將會(huì)接受中國加入世貿(mào)組織以表示對(duì)整體美國的好感。不 18. 管是商人院外活動(dòng)集團(tuán)的作用，19. 還是明確指20. 出重開談判的重要性。這一歷史事件太重要絕不21. 能因黨爭而22. 失去機(jī)會(huì)。共和黨縱然心中不23. 愿，24. 也不25. 得不26. 接受現(xiàn)實(shí)。心情是矛盾的。
B. 贊賞。 C. 不贊成。 D. 厭惡。
27. D. 商界。第一段中就點(diǎn)出：商界領(lǐng)袖對(duì)失去這次機(jī)會(huì)火冒三丈。第二段中提到商界院外活動(dòng)成員要以實(shí)實(shí)在在的協(xié)議來說服28. 共和黨國會(huì)， 29. 免得以黨爭告終。第三段明確指30. 出：許多商界院外人士一方面對(duì)協(xié)議未簽定表示失望，31. 另方面又同32. 意，33. 還會(huì)更好的條件。各種和商界直接關(guān)系的高級(jí)官員對(duì)克林頓勸說。
第五段：紡織，金融股票，汽車以至電影等都是商界的要求。朱總理拒絕的就是商界要求。
第六段提及商界院外活動(dòng)的成員制止國會(huì)事先接受最終協(xié)定。
最后一段又是商界使共和黨聯(lián)盟和白宮懂得此事的重要性。
34. A. 美國將會(huì)作出讓步，35. 見上面注釋。商人是絕對(duì)不36. 會(huì)放棄中國市場(chǎng)的。
B. 美國會(huì)故意拖延以求取得更好的條件。這一點(diǎn)恐怕不會(huì)，見上文注釋。朱總理的強(qiáng)硬立場(chǎng)，商人的見解。 C. 克林頓有簽署批準(zhǔn)中國入世之權(quán)。 D. 民主黨贊成中國加入世貿(mào)，這兩項(xiàng)都是事實(shí)。
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